{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007316","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5739-39v2-5754"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-15ec827bbba64c703f4d6a850b9a3d1f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.4.10 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-15ec827bbba64c703f4d6a850b9a3d1f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-15ec827bbba64c703f4d6a850b9a3d1f"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.4.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-15ec827bbba64c703f4d6a850b9a3d1f"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-15ec827bbba64c703f4d6a850b9a3d1f"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.4.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.168Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-31T14:52:48.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-18T21:09:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007316","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5739-39v2-5754"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.4.10 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.4.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d739a3f6db61a67c0706296fafce72b7"],"technology":"web-token/jwt-library","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rej","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:14.330Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-31T15:00:08.858Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-18T21:09:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}