{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007365","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHPSpreadsheet: Gnumeric reader unbounded gzip expansion causes memory exhaustion","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","CVE-2026-59932"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.18 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.6 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-23T15:00:18.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.461%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39986. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:42:43.803Z"},{"id":"sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59932","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, <= 5.8.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.2.0, <= 2.4.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-316458752caaa9129f85a2e767652600"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.30.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.8.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.898Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-23T15:00:18.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-23T15:00:17.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007365","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHPSpreadsheet: Gnumeric reader unbounded gzip expansion causes memory exhaustion","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","CVE-2026-59932"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.18 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.6 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.461%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39986. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"sr-8088efa44f7ca25560565873221b7436","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59932","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.8.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.080Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-23T16:27:55.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-23T15:00:17.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007365","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHPSpreadsheet: Gnumeric reader unbounded gzip expansion causes memory exhaustion","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","CVE-2026-59932"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.18 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.6 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.8.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8d117bd93002db5fa952162fef6bd52"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this->gzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:14.333Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-23T16:27:55.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-23T15:00:17.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"40769"}