{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007439","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Mautic Vulnerable to User Enumeration via Response Timing","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","CVE-2025-9824"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for mautic/core, mautic/core, mautic/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.4.17 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.2.8 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.0.5 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-155b8e8ca5dc2a784c2ad008c2390cef"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.283%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.20876. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-155b8e8ca5dc2a784c2ad008c2390cef"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.655Z"},{"id":"sr-155b8e8ca5dc2a784c2ad008c2390cef","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2025-9824","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.4.0; fixed 4.4.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-alpha; fixed 5.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-alpha; fixed 6.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:06.722Z","source_updated_at":"2025-09-03T22:27:22.612Z","source_disclosed_at":"2025-09-03T22:20:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.655Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007439","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Mautic Vulnerable to User Enumeration via Response Timing","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","CVE-2025-9824"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for mautic/core, mautic/core, mautic/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.4.17 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.2.8 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.0.5 for mautic/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.655Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.4.0; fixed 4.4.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-alpha; fixed 5.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dbf24b349636d0bab0e8cee281dec2c4"],"technology":"mautic/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:\n- A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)\n- An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)\n\nThe fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.\n\n### References\n- https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-alpha; fixed 6.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:14.337Z","source_updated_at":"2025-09-03T22:27:22.612Z","source_disclosed_at":"2025-09-03T22:20:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.655Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}