{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007718","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","CVE-2026-56737"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-402fc3c47edbe2889ee72d3b34b7c11f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.527%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.44635. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-402fc3c47edbe2889ee72d3b34b7c11f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-402fc3c47edbe2889ee72d3b34b7c11f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-56737","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.283Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.773Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T19:45:04.940Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:29:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007718","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","CVE-2026-56737"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3a5071cc027b56d27e8aa37d9d449bae"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.527%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4464. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3a5071cc027b56d27e8aa37d9d449bae"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-3a5071cc027b56d27e8aa37d9d449bae","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-56737","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:15.295Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T19:45:04.940Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:29:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007718","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","CVE-2026-56737"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.6 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e5ff1a17fe78c86fdccacc76b14f10c8"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId currentUse","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.2.0; fixed 4.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:18.631Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T19:45:04.940Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:29:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}