{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007841","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Path traversal in the images controller","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","CVE-2026-107844"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T20:53:57.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-9750278036fe801036a96c4d98586946"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.312%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24139. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9750278036fe801036a96c4d98586946","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107844","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9750278036fe801036a96c4d98586946"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9750278036fe801036a96c4d98586946"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.626Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:53:57.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:53:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007841","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Path traversal in the images controller","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","CVE-2026-107844"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.312%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24139. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrvp-7wmx-5m4h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"sr-07587bad3f0d446cb591d9f5e227b569","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107844","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-eabf1989145144ad1c2f125f267211e4"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ImagesController` joins the user controlled `{path}` onto the configured image target directory with `Path::join()`, which canonicalises `..` segments, and never calls `Path::isBasePath()` to confirm the result stayed inside that directory. An unauthenticated GET with percent encoded dot segments therefore escapes the directory and the file is returned by `BinaryFileResponse`. Reads are bounded to the extensions in `contao.image.valid_extensions`, and paths below the upload directory fail for an unrelated reason, so this is reported as a missing boundary check rather than as a general arbitrary file read. Both Apache with the shipped `public/.htaccess` and nginx with the documented configuration are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor can read files that are deliberately kept outside the document root, anywhere under the project directory, as long as the name ends in one of `contao.image.valid_extensions` (`jpg`, `jpeg`, `gif`, `png`, `tif`, `tiff`, `bmp`, `svg`, `svgz`, `webp`). The route also acts as an existence oracle for arbitrary paths, and on a debug enabled instance the 404 message discloses the absolute filesystem path.\n\n**Honesty caveat, stated because it ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.222Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T21:00:10.323Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:53:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}