{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007873","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailjet Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the Configured Secret — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","CVE-2026-45754"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-227ef5b5a85c0080527973219ca1dba9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.445%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.38747. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-227ef5b5a85c0080527973219ca1dba9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"},{"id":"sr-227ef5b5a85c0080527973219ca1dba9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45754","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.785Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.432Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.813Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:22:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007873","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailjet Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the Configured Secret — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","CVE-2026-45754"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-cc65b2cd9ce2d8ffd19711fcd7c45a07"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.445%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.38713. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-cc65b2cd9ce2d8ffd19711fcd7c45a07"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"},{"id":"sr-cc65b2cd9ce2d8ffd19711fcd7c45a07","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45754","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T21:03:48.037Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.813Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:22:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007873","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailjet Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the Configured Secret — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","CVE-2026-45754"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/lox24-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ebf1ad0e95af55ca4cf332d0cc40dff3"],"technology":"symfony/mailjet-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username).\n\n`Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:18.638Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.813Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:22:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.930Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}