{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":6,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1ee81f5bc46cbacca4472f2b79066152"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.650%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.51202. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1ee81f5bc46cbacca4472f2b79066152"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54176","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:50.402Z"},{"id":"sr-1ee81f5bc46cbacca4472f2b79066152","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.787Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.418Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2d70c46ed37a9fe2bf0a57a2dc8e056a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.650%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.51157. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2d70c46ed37a9fe2bf0a57a2dc8e056a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54176","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:50.402Z"},{"id":"sr-2d70c46ed37a9fe2bf0a57a2dc8e056a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.282Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:11.464Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.650%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5116. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"sr-31685abaa189b5d668e54f7677baecdc","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54176","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:50.402Z"},{"id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.928Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.650%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5116. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27254e98ae2f4b91f922dc2c0341a844"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.551Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.650%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5116. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"sr-6434089ad3b363bbce8749b3cdd53746","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54176","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:45:38.548Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:48:09.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","CVE-2026-54176"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ee7d4c517ce0c99c12e0991b14841632"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to\n`$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n  before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRU","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:18.641Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:48:09.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.686Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}