{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008020","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","CVE-2026-49283"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy, simplesamlphp/saml2. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.2.1 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.6 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1f347a4bf7f83d5c98580dbc6ee233bc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.472%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.40826. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1f347a4bf7f83d5c98580dbc6ee233bc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"},{"id":"sr-1f347a4bf7f83d5c98580dbc6ee233bc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-49283","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.281Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.2.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.139Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-04T21:30:19.900Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:25:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008020","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","CVE-2026-49283"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy, simplesamlphp/saml2. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.2.1 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.6 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8aaebe0d55bc738c9aaaea8b4d41699c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.472%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.40833. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-8aaebe0d55bc738c9aaaea8b4d41699c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"},{"id":"sr-8aaebe0d55bc738c9aaaea8b4d41699c","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-49283","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.2.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.130Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-04T21:30:19.900Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:25:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008020","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","CVE-2026-49283"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy, simplesamlphp/saml2. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.2.1 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.6 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.20.2 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.19.3 for simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.2.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.20.0; fixed 4.20.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f2577aaa8db2732425b8baee9a8c1376"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.\n\nIn the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.\n\nThe critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.\n\nIn a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA mal","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.19.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:22.826Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-04T21:30:19.900Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:25:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.933Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}