{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008040","kind":"vulnerability","title":"EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","CVE-2026-81892"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle, easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-058a1e014e20b4c2b5aac0a9d331dbc1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.29.16 for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-02T14:39:12.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e2b08a40906a6870bc2833e42b57285"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0a9a58880bc9d4f549c29665654d252c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.448%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.38983. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-058a1e014e20b4c2b5aac0a9d331dbc1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e2b08a40906a6870bc2833e42b57285","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:43.711Z"},{"id":"sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.409Z"},{"id":"sr-0a9a58880bc9d4f549c29665654d252c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81892","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-81892","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:13.348Z"},{"id":"sr-058a1e014e20b4c2b5aac0a9d331dbc1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-81892","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.083Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e2b08a40906a6870bc2833e42b57285"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.29.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e2b08a40906a6870bc2833e42b57285"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.5.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.29.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.5.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:41.547Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T14:39:12.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-02T14:39:11.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.409Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008040","kind":"vulnerability","title":"EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","CVE-2026-81892"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle, easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.29.16 for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for easycorp/easyadmin-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.409Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.29.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f305f8e836232b7b419d5d4192d1e4a3"],"technology":"easycorp/easyadmin-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Pa","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.5.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:22.827Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T14:45:06.582Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-02T14:39:11.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.409Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}