{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008097","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Misses URL Attributes","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","CVE-2026-48761"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.703Z","value":"6.1 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-07ab3bb7c3e669e3771f6f6846b1c93b"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.703Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-07ab3bb7c3e669e3771f6f6846b1c93b"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.345%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27998. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"},{"id":"sr-07ab3bb7c3e669e3771f6f6846b1c93b","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48761","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-48761","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:35.055Z"},{"id":"sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48761","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.855Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.899Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.216Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T16:46:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008097","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Misses URL Attributes","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","CVE-2026-48761"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.345%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27998. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"},{"id":"sr-0809e3dee41e9560069c40619db84c95","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48761","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.855Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.022Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.216Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T16:46:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008097","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Misses URL Attributes","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","CVE-2026-48761"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10b0dbebe8f1f6d006e6a6facf705979"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.345%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.28014. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-10b0dbebe8f1f6d006e6a6facf705979"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"},{"id":"sr-10b0dbebe8f1f6d006e6a6facf705979","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48761","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.381Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f5e47932f2127a11a1e097ff4f1e298b"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: ``, ``, `` and ``, `` and ``. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement('object', ['data'])`, `allowElement('applet', ['codebase'])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElement","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:48.406Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.216Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T16:46:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.440Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}