{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008248","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's JsonPath Evaluates Attacker-Controlled Regular Expressions in match()/search() Without Limits — ReDoS","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","CVE-2026-45756"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/json-path, symfony/json-path, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-261b83dda6721b886622df4430d85fe2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.237Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.237Z","value":"8.2 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50182. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-261b83dda6721b886622df4430d85fe2"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45756","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45756","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:20.969Z"},{"id":"sr-261b83dda6721b886622df4430d85fe2","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45756","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:33.662Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.368Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:34:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008248","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's JsonPath Evaluates Attacker-Controlled Regular Expressions in match()/search() Without Limits — ReDoS","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","CVE-2026-45756"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/json-path, symfony/json-path, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.237Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:10.237Z","value":"8.2 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50191. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"sr-1cbae1b5815b7a4d2998d3c35ae839cd","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45756","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45756","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:20.969Z"},{"id":"sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45756","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.917Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.368Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:34:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008248","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's JsonPath Evaluates Attacker-Controlled Regular Expressions in match()/search() Without Limits — ReDoS","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","CVE-2026-45756"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/json-path, symfony/json-path, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50191. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"sr-3b206b3b27b1037ece3527ce507d7042","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45756","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:15.296Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.368Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:34:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008248","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's JsonPath Evaluates Attacker-Controlled Regular Expressions in match()/search() Without Limits — ReDoS","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","CVE-2026-45756"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/json-path, symfony/json-path, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/json-path. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v8v-g73j-492j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/json-path","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.3.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fbea8a2c52bcbc4a124ec438ed20aeb3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe `JsonPath` component's `match()` and `search()` filter functions compile a caller-supplied pattern straight into `preg_match()`:\n\n```php\n'match'  => @preg_match(\\sprintf('/^%s$/u', $this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])), $value),\n'search' => @preg_match(\"/{$this->transformJsonPathRegex($argList[1])}/u\", $value),\n```\n\n`transformJsonPathRegex()` only performs cosmetic escaping: there is no length cap, no restriction to the RFC 9485 i-regexp subset, and no bound on backtracking. An application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath expression server-side (e.g. one taken from a query parameter or API field and passed to `JsonCrawler`) can therefore be made to run a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `$[?search(@, \"(a+)+$\")]`. Evaluated against a moderately sized document, this pins a CPU core for seconds per request, so a handful of concurrent requests exhausts the worker pool: a denial of service. Because the `preg_match()` calls are prefixed with `@`, the PCRE backtrack-limit errors that would otherwise surface are suppressed, leaving no log trace.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\nAn application that evaluates an attacker-influenced JSONPath ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:22.836Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.368Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:34:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}