{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008308","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Kunstmaan CMS: MediaBundle extension blacklist bypass allows authenticated administrators to upload executable PHP files leading to remote code execution","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","CVE-2026-104890"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for kunstmaan/media-bundle, kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16e27950c4f3136d1105fc5bd12705fd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/media-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.416%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35967. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16e27950c4f3136d1105fc5bd12705fd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"sr-16e27950c4f3136d1105fc5bd12705fd","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104890","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.770Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.370Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008308","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Kunstmaan CMS: MediaBundle extension blacklist bypass allows authenticated administrators to upload executable PHP files leading to remote code execution","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","CVE-2026-104890"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for kunstmaan/media-bundle, kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0152b560320e644443aa52270c097c3b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/media-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.416%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35931. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0152b560320e644443aa52270c097c3b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"sr-0152b560320e644443aa52270c097c3b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104890","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.263Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:07.735Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008308","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Kunstmaan CMS: MediaBundle extension blacklist bypass allows authenticated administrators to upload executable PHP files leading to remote code execution","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","CVE-2026-104890"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for kunstmaan/media-bundle, kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/media-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.416%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3594. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104890","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9917f284d555832c1b62b371090bdbd"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:04:01.248Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008308","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Kunstmaan CMS: MediaBundle extension blacklist bypass allows authenticated administrators to upload executable PHP files leading to remote code execution","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","CVE-2026-104890"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for kunstmaan/media-bundle, kunstmaan/bundles-cms. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/media-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.3.2 for kunstmaan/bundles-cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.416%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3594. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"},{"id":"sr-0a4d15215f9868300cb67d427e412f14","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104890","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/media-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-fe2260e87fcd1a42d7adea3b65db37b5"],"technology":"kunstmaan/bundles-cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n  server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, …) unblocked\n  regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.3.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.227Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T18:15:11.799Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T18:05:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.985Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}