{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008416","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in publish-poc-test3 (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mq69-4j49-gmx8"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for publish-poc-test3, publish-poc-test3, publish-poc-test3, publish-poc-test3, publish-poc-test3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mq69-4j49-gmx8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mq69-4j49-gmx8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:59.340Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.27"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.19"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.26"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2369845cd00be6549138dd0bbe3d65b1"],"technology":"publish-poc-test3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4001a75b24abfa181a10e5d40931194f254304fcf5fda554488d3c242cc5db85)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle script creates a temporary directory, writes a fabricated package.json whose name is 'publish-poc-found-' (random suffix derived via 'openssl rand -hex 2'), and then invokes 'npm publish' from that directory. The literal string 'npm publish' is reconstructed at runtime by concatenating three fragments ('np', 'm pu', 'blish') through printf, specifically to prevent manifest and string scanners from matching the command. The publish runs against the public npm registry using whatever npm authentication context the installing environment currently has (an _authToken from ~/.npmrc, NPM_TOKEN / NODE_AUTH_TOKEN in the environment, or an active CI publish identity), so running 'npm install' of this package on a developer workstation or CI host that holds publish rights causes a new attacker-named package to be published under the installer's npm identity. The combination of credential abuse at install time, randomized attacker-chosen package naming, and deliberate obfuscation of the exact command performing the publish is characteristic registry se","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.21"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:22.845Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-26T09:31:07.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-26T09:31:06.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:59.340Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}