{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008522","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in formatting-subtitles (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2cph-9873-fh57"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for formatting-subtitles. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5b5fda76acfeb8e3e4201b39b7626dd6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b5fda76acfeb8e3e4201b39b7626dd6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2cph-9873-fh57","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2cph-9873-fh57","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:57:08.488Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b5fda76acfeb8e3e4201b39b7626dd6"],"technology":"formatting-subtitles","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (25577370189f57a5678b2f2c45e212abfc79a3675dc7d51581f633e78aba47a6)\npackage.json declares `preinstall: sh./prepare.js && exit 0`. prepare.js is shaped like JavaScript (ending with `console.log('hello world')`) but is executed by /bin/sh, which does not treat `/**... */` as a comment. Inside that block, sh evaluates two `$(...)` command substitutions: one issues a GET to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/9e8c8742-3102-4716-aa8b-e150e9e84fe7/stats_1, and the other downloads https://api.github.com/gists/da04f14c93acbe9a7aef827be0a2e91c, extracts a file via jq, writes it to disk as `x`, and runs it with `sh x`. On `npm install`, the installer host fetches and executes arbitrary, unpinned, attacker-controlled content from a mutable GitHub Gist, and the webhook.site beacon discloses the install (and curl-visible metadata such as public IP and user-agent) to the attacker. The JS-comment-wrapping of the shell payload is a deliberate cover story so prepare.js reads as a trivial hello-world when viewed as JavaScript.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/f17c406fb7ee5","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.099Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T09:31:54.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T09:31:46.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:57:08.488Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}