{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008781","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in friendly-greeting-tools (PyPI)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-97c4-9mc7-j7wv"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for friendly-greeting-tools, friendly-greeting-tools, friendly-greeting-tools, friendly-greeting-tools, friendly-greeting-tools. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97c4-9mc7-j7wv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-97c4-9mc7-j7wv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:27.401Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e63f3d61500464509cd04c7e1bd52566"],"technology":"friendly-greeting-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)\nThe package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role,","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.3.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.116Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-29T15:31:37.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-30T21:31:19.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:27.401Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}