{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008848","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nginx UI: TOTP / passkey enrolment requires no re-authentication, enabling persistent account takeover","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","CVE-2026-84313"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1c55fa45dcd7b28be991ae155fb5625e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T15:04:58.000Z","value":"8.8 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.542%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45596. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1c55fa45dcd7b28be991ae155fb5625e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-1c55fa45dcd7b28be991ae155fb5625e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-84313","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.288Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c"],"technology":"github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEndpoints that bind a TOTP secret (`POST /api/otp_enroll`) or register a WebAuthn passkey (`POST /api/finish_passkey_register`) for the *current* user require only a valid JWT. There is no current-password re-prompt and the routes are explicitly registered **outside** the `RequireSecureSession()` group. With only a stolen JWT, an attacker can attach their own second factor to the victim's account, surviving any subsequent password rotation and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n## Details\n\n`api/user/router.go:34-39` — note the routes registered *before* the secure-session group:\n\n```go\nr.GET(\"/otp_secret\", GenerateTOTP)\nr.POST(\"/otp_enroll\", EnrollTOTP)                     // ← outside RequireSecureSession\nr.GET(\"/begin_passkey_register\", BeginPasskeyRegistration)\nr.POST(\"/finish_passkey_register\", FinishPasskeyRegistration)  // ← outside RequireSecureSession\n\no := r.Group(\"\", middleware.RequireSecureSession())\n{\n    o.GET(\"/otp_reset\", ResetOTP)                     // reset *is* protected — inconsistent\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`EnrollTOTP` (`api/user/otp.go:45-102`) only refuses if `cUser.EnabledOTP()` is already `true`; for any victim who has never enabled TOTP it accepts an at","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.113Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T15:04:58.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:11:32.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008848","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nginx UI: TOTP / passkey enrolment requires no re-authentication, enabling persistent account takeover","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","CVE-2026-84313"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T15:04:58.000Z","value":"8.8 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gfrc-g87h-7h5w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-01b3d33f10fe62cd5e8f8c03fcb9d37c"],"technology":"github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEndpoints that bind a TOTP secret (`POST /api/otp_enroll`) or register a WebAuthn passkey (`POST /api/finish_passkey_register`) for the *current* user require only a valid JWT. There is no current-password re-prompt and the routes are explicitly registered **outside** the `RequireSecureSession()` group. With only a stolen JWT, an attacker can attach their own second factor to the victim's account, surviving any subsequent password rotation and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n## Details\n\n`api/user/router.go:34-39` — note the routes registered *before* the secure-session group:\n\n```go\nr.GET(\"/otp_secret\", GenerateTOTP)\nr.POST(\"/otp_enroll\", EnrollTOTP)                     // ← outside RequireSecureSession\nr.GET(\"/begin_passkey_register\", BeginPasskeyRegistration)\nr.POST(\"/finish_passkey_register\", FinishPasskeyRegistration)  // ← outside RequireSecureSession\n\no := r.Group(\"\", middleware.RequireSecureSession())\n{\n    o.GET(\"/otp_reset\", ResetOTP)                     // reset *is* protected — inconsistent\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`EnrollTOTP` (`api/user/otp.go:45-102`) only refuses if `cUser.EnabledOTP()` is already `true`; for any victim who has never enabled TOTP it accepts an at","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.119Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T15:04:58.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:11:32.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}