{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage catalog rules can be bypassed for URL locations using encoded path segments","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","CVE-2026-115923"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend, @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.9.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T18:18:39.190Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-34877ed38ce2800644bef144d2ddb7b8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.317%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24714. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:16.868Z"},{"id":"sr-34877ed38ce2800644bef144d2ddb7b8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115923","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-115923","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:00.529Z"},{"id":"sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115923","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.393Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage catalog rules can be bypassed for URL locations using encoded path segments","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","CVE-2026-115923"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend, @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.9.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.317%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24714. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:16.868Z"},{"id":"sr-721bf9fb8b3e5eba5176d3fbff96bc05","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115923","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.593Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage catalog rules can be bypassed for URL locations using encoded path segments","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","CVE-2026-115923"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend, @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.9.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:16.868Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3831999974c70a17f3dc4ed2050656ab"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:14.082Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage catalog rules can be bypassed for URL locations using encoded path segments","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","CVE-2026-115923"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend, @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-16e96122feecfd0035895c272106ab43"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend` matches URL-type locations against `catalog.rules` location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using `catalog.rules` location patterns, `DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer` applies glob matching directly to the raw `location.target` string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as `https:///trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml` matches a `https:///trusted/**` pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from `https:///attacker/repo/...` when its content is read.\n\nAn authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (`catalog.location.create`) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.120Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:38.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T22:42:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}