{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008902","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","CVE-2026-118657"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4. 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This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T14:17:31.737Z","value":"5.9 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-4e610a3e2a3950253dfde457329634e5"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.133%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.02835. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1565bc1e0e386700c89bd5249b7b5b6d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-4e610a3e2a3950253dfde457329634e5","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118657","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-118657","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T07:00:25.983Z"},{"id":"sr-1565bc1e0e386700c89bd5249b7b5b6d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-118657","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.268Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.16.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T18:43:12.110Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008902","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","CVE-2026-118657"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1565bc1e0e386700c89bd5249b7b5b6d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.133%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.02835. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1565bc1e0e386700c89bd5249b7b5b6d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-1565bc1e0e386700c89bd5249b7b5b6d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-118657","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.268Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.16.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:18.498Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008902","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","CVE-2026-118657"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-864504fc531fae6255c723a21d02ef49"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.133%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.0283. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-864504fc531fae6255c723a21d02ef49"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-864504fc531fae6255c723a21d02ef49","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-118657","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.375Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.16.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.113Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008902","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","CVE-2026-118657"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-249e0920a1a03812e458516f86718e70"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\n`Context.Scheme()` unconditionally trusts four client-controlled HTTP headers to determine the request scheme, with no mechanism to configure trusted sources. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass HTTPS redirect enforcement and suppress HSTS headers.\n\nThe trusted headers (checked in this order of precedence):\n1. `X-Forwarded-Proto`\n2. `X-Forwarded-Protocol`\n3. `X-Forwarded-Ssl`\n4. `X-Url-Scheme`\n\n### Threat model\n\n**Scenario A — Directly exposed application (vulnerable by default):**\nThe Echo application listens on HTTP and is reachable directly by clients (no L7 proxy in front), or an attacker can bypass the proxy and reach the backend directly. In this case, the attacker has full control over all request headers. Sending `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` defeats the `HTTPSRedirect` middleware entirely — traffic stays on plaintext HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\nThis is the primary scenario. The application is vulnerable by default with no misconfiguration required — simply using `e.Pre(middleware.HTTPSRedirect())` as documented is sufficient.\n\n**Scenario B — Behind L7 proxy with header sanitization (reduced risk):**\nIf the application is stri","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.16.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.121Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:04:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}