{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008904","kind":"vulnerability","title":"better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","CVE-2026-114607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0fa582690b9e22ccad8506d0970c214f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.7 for better-auth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","value":"9.1 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.420%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.36329. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0fa582690b9e22ccad8506d0970c214f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:23.105Z"},{"id":"sr-0fa582690b9e22ccad8506d0970c214f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-114607","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.776Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 1.4.0-beta.18; fixed 1.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T00:29:57.279Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008904","kind":"vulnerability","title":"better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","CVE-2026-114607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2069a9154a918b1711564230091d0dcd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.7 for better-auth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","value":"9.1 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.420%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.36296. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2069a9154a918b1711564230091d0dcd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:23.105Z"},{"id":"sr-2069a9154a918b1711564230091d0dcd","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-114607","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.266Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 1.4.0-beta.18; fixed 1.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.145Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008904","kind":"vulnerability","title":"better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","CVE-2026-114607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.7 for better-auth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","value":"9.1 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:23.105Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66e4d0e3bd770cb892fe4002ef49bb6d"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 1.4.0-beta.18; fixed 1.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.346Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008904","kind":"vulnerability","title":"better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","CVE-2026-114607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","value":"9.1 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-965c-763c-88jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-26e3e3cc6a5040e7c8e6165ad179db36"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.\n\nYou are affected if **all** of these are true:\n\n- Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: \"plain\"`, or with `storeToken: \"hashed\"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: \"hashed\"` (including a hashed default).\n- At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled.\n- OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: \"database\"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.\n\nCookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.\n\n## Summary\n\nBetter Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.122Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T15:32:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:51.534Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}