{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008906","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped tls options in Agent","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","CVE-2026-109383"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-19T20:45:52.410Z","value":"7.4 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-860e7f9e5edb6e33aeff2ec3d9b882b7"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-19T20:45:52.410Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-860e7f9e5edb6e33aeff2ec3d9b882b7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.184%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08023. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:27.502Z"},{"id":"sr-860e7f9e5edb6e33aeff2ec3d9b882b7","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109383","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-109383","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:37.778Z"},{"id":"sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-109383","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.399Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008906","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped tls options in Agent","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","CVE-2026-109383"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.184%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08023. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:27.502Z"},{"id":"sr-a19c3fda25eefa96fc7dbafba5c351a8","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-109383","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.179Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008906","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped tls options in Agent","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","CVE-2026-109383"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:27.502Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5613e257e2dfcfe815aeefb73ebdf816"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.345Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008906","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped tls options in Agent","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","CVE-2026-109383"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-281f8adf6ac0a0a69044a6a1bc39865a"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nundici's `Agent` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-origin `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `Agent`. Because `Agent` is the default dispatcher behind `request`, `fetch`, and `setGlobalDispatcher`, this is the path most applications use. `EnvHttpProxyAgent` is also affected on its direct and `NO_PROXY` routes, which delegate to an internal `Agent`.\n\nOnly applications that pass a function-valued `tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` for certificate or public-key pinning) are affected. Passing the same options through `connect` is not affected. This is the `Agent` counterpart of the `BalancedPool` certificate validation bypass fixed in CVE-2026-84961.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`. `Age","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.122Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}