{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00008951","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Highcharts Core: `javascript:` URL in an `xlink:href` attribute survives text filtering and reaches exported charts","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","CVE-2026-116796"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for highcharts, highcharts, highcharts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.4.9 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.6.2 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 13.1.1 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-29T19:17:18.550Z","value":"7.2 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-85cb7b1fe96472287c6a04dfd7e65c7c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.337%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27164. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:53:54.040Z"},{"id":"sr-85cb7b1fe96472287c6a04dfd7e65c7c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116796","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-116796","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:08.616Z"},{"id":"sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-116796","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.3.2, < 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 12.0.0, < 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.0.0, <= 13.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 10.3.2; fixed 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 13.0.0; fixed 13.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.399Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008951","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Highcharts Core: `javascript:` URL in an `xlink:href` attribute survives text filtering and reaches exported charts","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","CVE-2026-116796"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for highcharts, highcharts, highcharts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.4.9 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.6.2 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 13.1.1 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.337%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27164. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:53:54.040Z"},{"id":"sr-ce2b88b24df012cf9450646b30e1ba18","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-116796","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.3.2, < 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 12.0.0, < 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.0.0, <= 13.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 10.3.2; fixed 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 13.0.0; fixed 13.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T21:03:48.042Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008951","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Highcharts Core: `javascript:` URL in an `xlink:href` attribute survives text filtering and reaches exported charts","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","CVE-2026-116796"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for highcharts, highcharts, highcharts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.4.9 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.6.2 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 13.1.1 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:53:54.040Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.3.2, < 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 12.0.0, < 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.0.0, <= 13.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 10.3.2; fixed 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c8245bcf3834d37242e3b56bce933618"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 13.0.0; fixed 13.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.349Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00008951","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Highcharts Core: `javascript:` URL in an `xlink:href` attribute survives text filtering and reaches exported charts","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","CVE-2026-116796"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for highcharts, highcharts, highcharts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.3.2, < 11.4.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 12.0.0, < 12.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4793ebe6238f71e8ef39faa3370bf5ba"],"technology":"highcharts","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there.\n\nThe attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link.\n\nExploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.0.0, <= 13.1.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:27.124Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T19:55:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}