{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009040","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Electrum: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","CVE-2026-117601"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electrum. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-ba552410a8eb9fab690a028d971682cf"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:23:45.000Z","value":"7.5 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.176%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07132. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-ba552410a8eb9fab690a028d971682cf"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-ba552410a8eb9fab690a028d971682cf","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-117601","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8"],"technology":"electrum","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool (\"unconfirmed\") transactions. This is documented design. [0]\n\nHowever now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it:\n- when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it,\n- and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address.\n- Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design).\n- The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed.\n- If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.\n\n### Fixes\n\nCommit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3.\nThe client now verifies the signatures of `wallet.is_mine` inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).\n\nUsers should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case).\nAs a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.8.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T03:52:54.832Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:23:45.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:23:44.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009040","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Electrum: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","CVE-2026-117601"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electrum. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:23:45.000Z","value":"7.5 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-868ea30803e555e577472e4f8b56dba8"],"technology":"electrum","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool (\"unconfirmed\") transactions. This is documented design. [0]\n\nHowever now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it:\n- when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it,\n- and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address.\n- Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design).\n- The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed.\n- If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.\n\n### Fixes\n\nCommit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3.\nThe client now verifies the signatures of `wallet.is_mine` inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).\n\nUsers should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case).\nAs a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.8.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.268Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:23:45.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:23:44.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}