{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009057","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@nx/maven and @nx/gradle have OS command injection via nx.json plugin options","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","CVE-2026-119282"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @nx/maven, @nx/maven, @nx/gradle, @nx/gradle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 22.7.9 for @nx/maven. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 23.1.2 for @nx/maven. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 22.7.9 for @nx/gradle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 23.1.2 for @nx/gradle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-30T19:37:07.073Z","value":"7.3 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5c6e55c199ce17131a08db139558e952"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.140%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.03375. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:39.264Z"},{"id":"sr-5c6e55c199ce17131a08db139558e952","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119282","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-119282","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:24.124Z"},{"id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-119282","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.375Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.2, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 22.0.2; fixed 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 23.0.0; fixed 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 21.0.0; fixed 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 23.0.0; fixed 23.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:42.461Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009057","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@nx/maven and @nx/gradle have OS command injection via nx.json plugin options","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","CVE-2026-119282"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @nx/maven, @nx/maven, @nx/gradle, @nx/gradle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 22.7.9 for @nx/maven. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 23.1.2 for @nx/maven. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 22.7.9 for @nx/gradle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 23.1.2 for @nx/gradle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.140%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.03375. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:39.264Z"},{"id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-119282","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.375Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.2, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 22.0.2; fixed 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 23.0.0; fixed 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 21.0.0; fixed 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dd0b47fddc65f95781b23272965dbaa6"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 23.0.0; fixed 23.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:14.088Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009057","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@nx/maven and @nx/gradle have OS command injection via nx.json plugin options","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","CVE-2026-119282"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @nx/maven, @nx/maven, @nx/gradle, @nx/gradle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.140%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.03375. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"sr-6521c8943fb25c19c0332bb3a0f91f67","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-119282","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.375Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.2, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:45:38.550Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009057","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@nx/maven and @nx/gradle have OS command injection via nx.json plugin options","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","CVE-2026-119282"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @nx/maven, @nx/maven, @nx/gradle, @nx/gradle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qm8w-vx34-5j9j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.2, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/maven","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 22.7.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-950c021fc7b9d833c12f98412dbaf737"],"technology":"@nx/gradle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@nx/maven` and `@nx/gradle` spawn their project-graph analyzers through a shell and interpolate plugin options read from `nx.json` straight into the command line. Because a shell parses the whole line, an option value containing shell syntax is executed as a command by any `nx` command that constructs the project graph. Anyone who clones a hostile repository, or who checks out a pull request that edits `nx.json`, runs the injected command with their own privileges.\n\n## Severity\n\nA victim who runs an ordinary `nx` command in an attacker-supplied Maven or Gradle workspace gets code execution as themselves. In most such workspaces an attacker who can write `nx.json` can already run code through the repository's build files (`./mvnw`, `pom.xml`, and the Gradle equivalents), so the genuinely new exposure is narrow — for example CI building a fork's pull request where `nx.json` is writable but the build files are not. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected & Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `@nx/maven` | `>= 22.0.2, = 23.0.0, = 21.0.0, < 22.7.9`; ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.272Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-30T14:42:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:55:49.621Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}