{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009081","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","CVE-2026-115912"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-03014826e2892819c6a0be9a7b4fe77a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.510%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43666. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-03014826e2892819c6a0be9a7b4fe77a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-03014826e2892819c6a0be9a7b4fe77a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115912","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T00:24:57.632Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM < 0.32.0.\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM's multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.\n\nThis is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` (v0.25.1):\n\n- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:42.530Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009081","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","CVE-2026-115912"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-054db80bf5ef41b328a74891f0e5152b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.510%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4364. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-054db80bf5ef41b328a74891f0e5152b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-054db80bf5ef41b328a74891f0e5152b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115912","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.313Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM < 0.32.0.\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM's multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.\n\nThis is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` (v0.25.1):\n\n- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.257Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009081","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","CVE-2026-115912"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-440211988f4633432bce9631c1c3eb08"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.510%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43527. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-440211988f4633432bce9631c1c3eb08"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-440211988f4633432bce9631c1c3eb08","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115912","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM < 0.32.0.\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM's multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.\n\nThis is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` (v0.25.1):\n\n- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:17.228Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009081","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","CVE-2026-115912"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a3ce8415be9917f52a749b1831ee7086"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM < 0.32.0.\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen `--mm-processor-cache-type shm` is enabled, vLLM's multimodal SHM cache represents a cached item with an `address` and `monotonic_id` pair and treats that pair as authority to dereference shared memory in the worker. A public scale-out request can supply its own multimodal `features.kwargs_data`, so an authenticated caller can forge an inner SHM carrier that points at attacker-controlled bytes already staged in the ring buffer. The worker then reaches `pickle.loads()` while deserializing the forged object.\n\nThis is reachable through ordinary public HTTP routes and does not require `VLLM_ALLOW_INSECURE_SERIALIZATION=1`. The live chain used `/v1/chat/completions/render` to obtain a valid feature envelope, `/v1/chat/completions` to stage attacker-chosen bytes into SHM, and `/inference/v1/generate` to submit the forged inner carrier.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` (v0.25.1):\n\n- [`vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py#L375-L400`](ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.275Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:15:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}