{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009116","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","CVE-2026-118661"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for happy-dom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-00d264498acdf8d2b313489230bf140e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 20.14.6 for happy-dom. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.272%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19656. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-00d264498acdf8d2b313489230bf140e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:30:17.051Z"},{"id":"sr-00d264498acdf8d2b313489230bf140e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-118661","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.778Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["<= 20.14.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 20.14.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:41.529Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009116","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","CVE-2026-118661"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for happy-dom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-9d04331abc7c9f779f41fc7815e280d7"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 20.14.6 for happy-dom. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.272%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19628. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-9d04331abc7c9f779f41fc7815e280d7"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:30:17.051Z"},{"id":"sr-9d04331abc7c9f779f41fc7815e280d7","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-118661","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.375Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["<= 20.14.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 20.14.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.171Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009116","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","CVE-2026-118661"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for happy-dom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 20.14.6 for happy-dom. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:30:17.051Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["<= 20.14.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c6d6b731bd6a6a5a9dd311a62c979081"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 20.14.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:14.087Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009116","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","CVE-2026-118661"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for happy-dom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b6d625b661c052b646bae33f1c4e0dd9"],"technology":"happy-dom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.\n\n### Details\nhappy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js):\n```js\n// PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation\n// Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1)\n//        -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1)\n//        -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 + PSL)\n//        -> app's same-origin fetch to http://localhost:PORT2/api/account carries the forged cookie\n// Run:  cd C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day && node poc/poc-happydom-cook","public_affected_ranges":["<= 20.14.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.284Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:06:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}