{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009161","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","CVE-2026-87018"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0b9f57bcd0fb610a7b353d5dd631fe00"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.187%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08438. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0b9f57bcd0fb610a7b353d5dd631fe00"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:42.743Z"},{"id":"sr-0b9f57bcd0fb610a7b353d5dd631fe00","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-87018","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.076Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.1, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.2.1; fixed 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.752Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009161","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","CVE-2026-87018"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.187%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08364. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:42.743Z"},{"id":"sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-87018","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.385Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.1, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.2.1; fixed 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c11af4a0f7a054793d500eb255adc87d"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.349Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009161","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","CVE-2026-87018"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.187%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08364. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"sr-6fff7d66ee04bbd03e51ce69860f178a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-87018","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.385Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.1, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.585Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009161","kind":"vulnerability","title":"undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","CVE-2026-87018"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.1, < 6.29.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d8002c60f916d0dfcaa376bf670469a2"],"technology":"undici","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound conne","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.288Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:36.327Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}