{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009168","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: DoS via unbounded chat_template Jinja2 rendering exhausts the renderer thread pool","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","CVE-2026-115911"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8bb4690b593d3a0f94632d28e2bd14d1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:14:54.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.312%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24103. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-8bb4690b593d3a0f94632d28e2bd14d1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-8bb4690b593d3a0f94632d28e2bd14d1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115911","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nvLLM renders chat templates by passing the resolved Jinja2 source to `tokenizer.apply_chat_template()`, which compiles and `.render()`s it in an `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment`. The sandbox prevents code-execution escapes but imposes **no wall-clock timeout, no output-size cap, and no nested-loop or binop limit**. The render runs in a `ThreadPoolExecutor` whose `max_workers` defaults to **1**, and CPython worker threads cannot be interrupted. An authenticated API client (or a malicious model repo loaded with `trust_remote_code=False`) can therefore submit a single short template and permanently wedge **all** chat-style endpoints (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/responses`, `/tokenize`, `/pooling`-chat, `/invocations`-chat) for every tenant until the process is restarted. A string-multiplication variant instead OOM-kills the API-server process. Because of a separately-reported (GHSA-jmjw-q4x3-hmc2) gate omission on `/v1/responses`, the remote authenticated attacker vector works in **default `vllm serve` configuration** with no operator opt-in.\n\n### Impact\nA single authenticated request of <100 bytes permanently denies all chat-style inference (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/r","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.19.0, < 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.134Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:14:54.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:14:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009168","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vLLM: DoS via unbounded chat_template Jinja2 rendering exhausts the renderer thread pool","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","CVE-2026-115911"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:14:54.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-db13c7e1705c9ddc3a257caf37636c7b"],"technology":"vllm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nvLLM renders chat templates by passing the resolved Jinja2 source to `tokenizer.apply_chat_template()`, which compiles and `.render()`s it in an `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment`. The sandbox prevents code-execution escapes but imposes **no wall-clock timeout, no output-size cap, and no nested-loop or binop limit**. The render runs in a `ThreadPoolExecutor` whose `max_workers` defaults to **1**, and CPython worker threads cannot be interrupted. An authenticated API client (or a malicious model repo loaded with `trust_remote_code=False`) can therefore submit a single short template and permanently wedge **all** chat-style endpoints (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/responses`, `/tokenize`, `/pooling`-chat, `/invocations`-chat) for every tenant until the process is restarted. A string-multiplication variant instead OOM-kills the API-server process. Because of a separately-reported (GHSA-jmjw-q4x3-hmc2) gate omission on `/v1/responses`, the remote authenticated attacker vector works in **default `vllm serve` configuration** with no operator opt-in.\n\n### Impact\nA single authenticated request of <100 bytes permanently denies all chat-style inference (`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/r","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.19.0, < 0.32.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.288Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:14:54.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:14:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}