{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009174","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the attacker in as the victim","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","CVE-2026-115910"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for social-auth-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-06c865bb7ec38f4d4bbdc486d7dea75c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.157%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.04851. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-06c865bb7ec38f4d4bbdc486d7dea75c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-06c865bb7ec38f4d4bbdc486d7dea75c","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115910","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.313Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"],"technology":"social-auth-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user's session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.\n\nSo the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim's unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker's own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim's `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker's session, and the nonce in the victim's ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker's browser is now logged in as the victim.\n\nPKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the defaul","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.268Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009174","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the attacker in as the victim","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","CVE-2026-115910"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for social-auth-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2b60fa6394eba67e8d7caf5b7f4c97ff"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.157%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.04791. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2b60fa6394eba67e8d7caf5b7f4c97ff"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"sr-2b60fa6394eba67e8d7caf5b7f4c97ff","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-115910","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.374Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"],"technology":"social-auth-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user's session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.\n\nSo the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim's unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker's own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim's `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker's session, and the nonce in the victim's ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker's browser is now logged in as the victim.\n\nPKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the defaul","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:15.267Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00009174","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the attacker in as the victim","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","CVE-2026-115910"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for social-auth-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-e166128b1820c214526cf656f1623115"],"technology":"social-auth-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user's session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.\n\nSo the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim's unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker's own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim's `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker's session, and the nonce in the victim's ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker's browser is now logged in as the victim.\n\nPKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the defaul","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.1.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:31.288Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-28T21:16:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:56:08.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}