{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009673","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in crypti-toolbox (RubyGems)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-pv2w-f5fh-p8xw"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for crypti-toolbox. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-27851751c6e379ac3910cf969c699e25"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27851751c6e379ac3910cf969c699e25","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pv2w-f5fh-p8xw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-pv2w-f5fh-p8xw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27851751c6e379ac3910cf969c699e25"],"technology":"crypti-toolbox","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (5ec4d5d5915335d90b2f18b45b050936fa5d2db9d176d7d081bd8c292c7c6795)\nOn `gem install`, the native extension script ext/crypti-toolbox/extconf.rb runs an environment-fingerprinting routine that bails out on CI runners, ephemeral/sandbox hostnames, generated or analysis-shaped usernames, analysis path prefixes (/opt/rubygems, /tmp, /workspace), low machine uptime, and hosts lacking developer artifacts (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.gem/credentials). On hosts that pass those checks, the script base64-decodes a Ruby snippet and passes it to eval inside a double-forked, setsid-detached child that sleeps 20-40 minutes and then curls a tarball from http://45.138.122.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it to /tmp/.w1, and executes the embedded wg_install.sh under bash. The destination URL is hidden as a hex string XORed with a 4-byte key, and the shell command is wrapped in a base64-encoded eval payload. There is no pin, hash, or signature on the fetched content, the destination is a bare IP unrelated to any declared publisher, and the sandbox-evasion and daemonization logic exist only to attack real developer workstations while hiding from analysis environ","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:39.928Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-06T03:31:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T18:34:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}