{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009690","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in wix-ssr-thunderbolt-grid-polyfill (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-p2cp-cfm9-2v3m"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for wix-ssr-thunderbolt-grid-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2de1cd34c67d8c9f73b1688f5d0ef7de"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2de1cd34c67d8c9f73b1688f5d0ef7de","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p2cp-cfm9-2v3m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-p2cp-cfm9-2v3m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2de1cd34c67d8c9f73b1688f5d0ef7de"],"technology":"wix-ssr-thunderbolt-grid-polyfill","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (b6e0013701f6ab53085883b09092f0cd5ae9aaaab51a9f0e9de5aa68946ae9e1)\nThe package ships two minified bundles — dist/poc-model.bundle.min.js and dist/poc-bootstrap.bundle.min.js — that are wired as the model and bootstrap batches in rb_wixui.thunderbolt.manifest.min.json under baseURL https://static.parastorage.com/unpkg/wix-ssr-thunderbolt-grid-polyfill@0.1.0/dist/. When the manifest resolves inside a Wix Thunderbolt SSR worker, poc-model.bundle.min.js collects Node version, cwd, hostname, POD_IP, uid, os.networkInterfaces() output, the contents of /etc/hosts and /etc/resolv.conf, environment variable names, a DNS lookup of bo.wix.com, and the response bodies of a localhost port scan across 40+ ports (including 80, 443, 3000), and POSTs the aggregate via https.request to https://webhook.site/69bcd627-1871-4dda-b880-83b37ceac418. poc-bootstrap.bundle.min.js issues companion fetch and https.request beacons to the same webhook.site URL with src=ssr-bootstrap tags. The package has no legitimate Wix SSR polyfill functionality; its sole shipped behavior is host, filesystem, network, and internal-service reconnaissance against the SSR environment, exfiltrated to a","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:39.929Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-08T06:31:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-08T06:31:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}