{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00009901","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in testrrrd (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w6fg-gwpf-x5xf"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w6fg-gwpf-x5xf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w6fg-gwpf-x5xf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:01.069Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 3.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 99.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 2.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8dd9c1c06c8c53f7aad5bf7c283be3bf"],"technology":"testrrrd","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad)\nOn `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package","public_affected_ranges":["= 2.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:39.952Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T00:31:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T00:30:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:01.069Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}