{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010020","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in fabtoolkit (PyPI)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2j5q-cfcm-6vgm"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for fabtoolkit, fabtoolkit, fabtoolkit, fabtoolkit. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2j5q-cfcm-6vgm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2j5q-cfcm-6vgm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:01.047Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a"],"technology":"fabtoolkit","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (e55333b9d934a04c029943e0e6fbf34fff7c1344e0d1964b6860bc02d322855d)\nfabtoolkit executes a payload (embedded as a CHILD string run via `subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-I','-c',CHILD],...)`) that fetches a JSON config from https://transfer.archivete.am/H2Uxm/fabdeploycheck-config.json with TLS verification disabled (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`) and dispatches on config-supplied `kind` values: `file` reads arbitrary filesystem paths, `run` executes attacker-supplied argv via subprocess, `http` issues attacker-chosen requests with Bearer tokens chained from previously-read files, `tcp` probes ports, and `revsh` forks a daemon that polls `base+'/'+ident+'-cmd.txt'` and pipes the returned bytes into `/bin/sh -c`, PUTting stdout/stderr back to the same host. Collected file contents, command output, HTTP responses, and probe results are packed into an in-memory zip and PUT to transfer.archivete.am under an attacker-chosen report name. Before daemonizing, the payload walks `/proc/*/cmdline` and SIGKILLs processes whose cmdlines contain `FABDRV3`, `fabdrv2`, or `connection ready`, enforcing single-instance persistence and clearing prior variants. The entry ","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a"],"technology":"fabtoolkit","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (e55333b9d934a04c029943e0e6fbf34fff7c1344e0d1964b6860bc02d322855d)\nfabtoolkit executes a payload (embedded as a CHILD string run via `subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-I','-c',CHILD],...)`) that fetches a JSON config from https://transfer.archivete.am/H2Uxm/fabdeploycheck-config.json with TLS verification disabled (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`) and dispatches on config-supplied `kind` values: `file` reads arbitrary filesystem paths, `run` executes attacker-supplied argv via subprocess, `http` issues attacker-chosen requests with Bearer tokens chained from previously-read files, `tcp` probes ports, and `revsh` forks a daemon that polls `base+'/'+ident+'-cmd.txt'` and pipes the returned bytes into `/bin/sh -c`, PUTting stdout/stderr back to the same host. Collected file contents, command output, HTTP responses, and probe results are packed into an in-memory zip and PUT to transfer.archivete.am under an attacker-chosen report name. Before daemonizing, the payload walks `/proc/*/cmdline` and SIGKILLs processes whose cmdlines contain `FABDRV3`, `fabdrv2`, or `connection ready`, enforcing single-instance persistence and clearing prior variants. The entry ","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a"],"technology":"fabtoolkit","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (e55333b9d934a04c029943e0e6fbf34fff7c1344e0d1964b6860bc02d322855d)\nfabtoolkit executes a payload (embedded as a CHILD string run via `subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-I','-c',CHILD],...)`) that fetches a JSON config from https://transfer.archivete.am/H2Uxm/fabdeploycheck-config.json with TLS verification disabled (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`) and dispatches on config-supplied `kind` values: `file` reads arbitrary filesystem paths, `run` executes attacker-supplied argv via subprocess, `http` issues attacker-chosen requests with Bearer tokens chained from previously-read files, `tcp` probes ports, and `revsh` forks a daemon that polls `base+'/'+ident+'-cmd.txt'` and pipes the returned bytes into `/bin/sh -c`, PUTting stdout/stderr back to the same host. Collected file contents, command output, HTTP responses, and probe results are packed into an in-memory zip and PUT to transfer.archivete.am under an attacker-chosen report name. Before daemonizing, the payload walks `/proc/*/cmdline` and SIGKILLs processes whose cmdlines contain `FABDRV3`, `fabdrv2`, or `connection ready`, enforcing single-instance persistence and clearing prior variants. The entry ","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-bf57e51898e2259e0f14df02232bc58a"],"technology":"fabtoolkit","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (e55333b9d934a04c029943e0e6fbf34fff7c1344e0d1964b6860bc02d322855d)\nfabtoolkit executes a payload (embedded as a CHILD string run via `subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-I','-c',CHILD],...)`) that fetches a JSON config from https://transfer.archivete.am/H2Uxm/fabdeploycheck-config.json with TLS verification disabled (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`) and dispatches on config-supplied `kind` values: `file` reads arbitrary filesystem paths, `run` executes attacker-supplied argv via subprocess, `http` issues attacker-chosen requests with Bearer tokens chained from previously-read files, `tcp` probes ports, and `revsh` forks a daemon that polls `base+'/'+ident+'-cmd.txt'` and pipes the returned bytes into `/bin/sh -c`, PUTting stdout/stderr back to the same host. Collected file contents, command output, HTTP responses, and probe results are packed into an in-memory zip and PUT to transfer.archivete.am under an attacker-chosen report name. Before daemonizing, the payload walks `/proc/*/cmdline` and SIGKILLs processes whose cmdlines contain `FABDRV3`, `fabdrv2`, or `connection ready`, enforcing single-instance persistence and clearing prior variants. The entry ","public_affected_ranges":["= 0.2.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.206Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T21:30:35.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-19T03:31:11.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:01.047Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}