{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010060","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in bitcoin-address-utils (RubyGems)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-pmhw-48q6-rhv3"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for bitcoin-address-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-ce0544cb22b87c0df811093b619a600b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ce0544cb22b87c0df811093b619a600b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pmhw-48q6-rhv3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-pmhw-48q6-rhv3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ce0544cb22b87c0df811093b619a600b"],"technology":"bitcoin-address-utils","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (8af579a1726db72e88f7c1755ebdec49a2d0a944d0e42a0fb36566d70d751e17)\nThe gem's native-extension build script extconf.rb, which runs automatically during `gem install`, decodes a base64-wrapped Ruby payload that XOR-decodes a hardcoded URL (approximately http://45.13.8.12:8092/wgkit.tar.gz, overridable via ENV['WG_KIT_URL']), downloads a tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it, and executes the embedded wg_install.sh via bash. Execution is double-forked and detached so it survives after the install process exits. The shipped C extension source is a two-line empty stub, so the extension exists only to run the dropper. The script contains anti-analysis gating: it refuses to execute inside CI, on ephemeral or sandbox hosts, under usernames matching /uA\\d+|sandbox|tester|analys|scanner/, on analysis paths such as /tmp, /var/tmp, /opt/rubygems, /workspace, and on hosts with uptime below 1800 seconds, and only detonates when developer-signal files exist (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.bundle). A 20-40 minute random sleep precedes execution. The attacker-controlled endpoint is a bare IP on a non-standard port with no pinning, hash verification","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.209Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-06T03:31:21.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T18:34:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:22.853Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}