{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010122","kind":"vulnerability","title":"fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","CVE-2026-110180"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1cb92f5f223b2b3b72171d63cd651954"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.8 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.9 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.3 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T20:06:37.150Z","value":"4.8 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-51ade0dbfb542562def325bb68fec699"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.255%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17102. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1cb92f5f223b2b3b72171d63cd651954"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:35:47.997Z"},{"id":"sr-51ade0dbfb542562def325bb68fec699","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110180","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:37.778Z"},{"id":"sr-1cb92f5f223b2b3b72171d63cd651954","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.840Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 2.4.2; fixed 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.1.3; fixed 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.1; fixed 4.2.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.724Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:37:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010122","kind":"vulnerability","title":"fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","CVE-2026-110180"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.8 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.9 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.3 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T20:06:37.150Z","value":"4.8 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-51ade0dbfb542562def325bb68fec699"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.255%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17126. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:35:47.997Z"},{"id":"sr-51ade0dbfb542562def325bb68fec699","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110180","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:37.778Z"},{"id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:20:46.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 2.4.2; fixed 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.1.3; fixed 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.1; fixed 4.2.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:23.267Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:37:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010122","kind":"vulnerability","title":"fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","CVE-2026-110180"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.8 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.9 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.3 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.255%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17126. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:35:47.997Z"},{"id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:20:46.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 2.4.2; fixed 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.1.3; fixed 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-45c2448cb60954bba303285689957a9f"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.0.1; fixed 4.2.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T03:52:54.735Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:37:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010122","kind":"vulnerability","title":"fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","CVE-2026-110180"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.255%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17126. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"sr-832dcf35fa8f97401dc7f37cdabbf092","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110180","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:20:46.853Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:21.819Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:37:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010122","kind":"vulnerability","title":"fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","CVE-2026-110180"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d2b0e056c93deb9166a65f82b36e6fe"],"technology":"fast-uri","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed.\n\nFor example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way.\n\nApplications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri` ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:48.416Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:38:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:37:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}