{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010559","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n^2)) DKIM header unfolding lets a large folded header cause remote denial of service during signing","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","CVE-2026-110871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.0.10 for nodemailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T03:17:14.553Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-6d6f9b43184c556ab0e7e6428eef30b7"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T03:17:14.553Z","value":"7.1 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-6d6f9b43184c556ab0e7e6428eef30b7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.381%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32081. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:35.474Z"},{"id":"sr-6d6f9b43184c556ab0e7e6428eef30b7","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110871","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-110871","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:37.778Z"},{"id":"sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110871","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen nodemailer DKIM-signs an outbound message, its DKIM message parser unfolds RFC 5322 header continuation lines with a loop that concatenates each continuation line onto the preceding line and then re-tests the anchored regex `/^[ \\t]/` against the growing merged line on every iteration. Re-testing the regex against the ever-growing accumulated line forces a full string flatten proportional to the accumulated length on each iteration, yielding O(n^2) CPU in the number of continuation lines. An application user who influences the size of a header that folds into many continuation lines (most naturally a large recipient list, but also a long custom header, Subject, or References) can drive tens of thousands of continuation lines and block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for seconds during signing, a repeatable denial of service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe invariant that signing a message performs work linear in the message size is violated in the header-unfolding step. In `src/dkim/message-parser.ts`, `parseHeaders()` splits the buffered header block into `lines` and iterates backward; for each line matching the continuation pattern `/^[ \\t]/`, it does `lines[i - 1] +=","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, <= 10.0.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen nodemailer DKIM-signs an outbound message, its DKIM message parser unfolds RFC 5322 header continuation lines with a loop that concatenates each continuation line onto the preceding line and then re-tests the anchored regex `/^[ \\t]/` against the growing merged line on every iteration. Re-testing the regex against the ever-growing accumulated line forces a full string flatten proportional to the accumulated length on each iteration, yielding O(n^2) CPU in the number of continuation lines. An application user who influences the size of a header that folds into many continuation lines (most naturally a large recipient list, but also a long custom header, Subject, or References) can drive tens of thousands of continuation lines and block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for seconds during signing, a repeatable denial of service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe invariant that signing a message performs work linear in the message size is violated in the header-unfolding step. In `src/dkim/message-parser.ts`, `parseHeaders()` splits the buffered header block into `lines` and iterates backward; for each line matching the continuation pattern `/^[ \\t]/`, it does `lines[i - 1] +=","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 10.0.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:42.488Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010559","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n^2)) DKIM header unfolding lets a large folded header cause remote denial of service during signing","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","CVE-2026-110871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.0.10 for nodemailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.381%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32081. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:35.474Z"},{"id":"sr-9d379967530e363d9d8f224ceb44e1d5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-110871","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen nodemailer DKIM-signs an outbound message, its DKIM message parser unfolds RFC 5322 header continuation lines with a loop that concatenates each continuation line onto the preceding line and then re-tests the anchored regex `/^[ \\t]/` against the growing merged line on every iteration. Re-testing the regex against the ever-growing accumulated line forces a full string flatten proportional to the accumulated length on each iteration, yielding O(n^2) CPU in the number of continuation lines. An application user who influences the size of a header that folds into many continuation lines (most naturally a large recipient list, but also a long custom header, Subject, or References) can drive tens of thousands of continuation lines and block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for seconds during signing, a repeatable denial of service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe invariant that signing a message performs work linear in the message size is violated in the header-unfolding step. In `src/dkim/message-parser.ts`, `parseHeaders()` splits the buffered header block into `lines` and iterates backward; for each line matching the continuation pattern `/^[ \\t]/`, it does `lines[i - 1] +=","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, <= 10.0.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-05465ec1df1f50dc72d9fb5afb9fbaae"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen nodemailer DKIM-signs an outbound message, its DKIM message parser unfolds RFC 5322 header continuation lines with a loop that concatenates each continuation line onto the preceding line and then re-tests the anchored regex `/^[ \\t]/` against the growing merged line on every iteration. Re-testing the regex against the ever-growing accumulated line forces a full string flatten proportional to the accumulated length on each iteration, yielding O(n^2) CPU in the number of continuation lines. An application user who influences the size of a header that folds into many continuation lines (most naturally a large recipient list, but also a long custom header, Subject, or References) can drive tens of thousands of continuation lines and block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for seconds during signing, a repeatable denial of service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe invariant that signing a message performs work linear in the message size is violated in the header-unfolding step. In `src/dkim/message-parser.ts`, `parseHeaders()` splits the buffered header block into `lines` and iterates backward; for each line matching the continuation pattern `/^[ \\t]/`, it does `lines[i - 1] +=","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 10.0.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T00:57:04.324Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010559","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n^2)) DKIM header unfolding lets a large folded header cause remote denial of service during signing","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","CVE-2026-110871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3cfba0608898a6cd612af840ef92a736"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen nodemailer DKIM-signs an outbound message, its DKIM message parser unfolds RFC 5322 header continuation lines with a loop that concatenates each continuation line onto the preceding line and then re-tests the anchored regex `/^[ \\t]/` against the growing merged line on every iteration. Re-testing the regex against the ever-growing accumulated line forces a full string flatten proportional to the accumulated length on each iteration, yielding O(n^2) CPU in the number of continuation lines. An application user who influences the size of a header that folds into many continuation lines (most naturally a large recipient list, but also a long custom header, Subject, or References) can drive tens of thousands of continuation lines and block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for seconds during signing, a repeatable denial of service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe invariant that signing a message performs work linear in the message size is violated in the header-unfolding step. In `src/dkim/message-parser.ts`, `parseHeaders()` splits the buffered header block into `lines` and iterates backward; for each line matching the continuation pattern `/^[ \\t]/`, it does `lines[i - 1] +=","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, <= 10.0.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.621Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:07:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}