{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010585","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","CVE-2026-111997"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.7.4 for ip-address. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ff4b99142cf9c51af3bf22b795387fb8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.315%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24412. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-ff4b99142cf9c51af3bf22b795387fb8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:17.735Z"},{"id":"sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-111997","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond.\n\nAn application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect.\n\n### Details\n\nThe constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left:\n\n```ts\nconst zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address);\n\nif (zone) {\n  this.zone = zone[0];\n\n  address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, '');\n}\n\nconst longest = this.groups * 5 + 5;\n\nif (address.length > longest) {\n  throw new AddressError(`IP","public_affected_ranges":["<= 10.7.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ff4b99142cf9c51af3bf22b795387fb8"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond.\n\nAn application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect.\n\n### Details\n\nThe constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left:\n\n```ts\nconst zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address);\n\nif (zone) {\n  this.zone = zone[0];\n\n  address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, '');\n}\n\nconst longest = this.groups * 5 + 5;\n\nif (address.length > longest) {\n  throw new AddressError(`IP","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 10.7.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T00:57:04.328Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010585","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","CVE-2026-111997"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.315%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24412. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-939f6789ac8d261752158180ad322db3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-111997","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond.\n\nAn application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect.\n\n### Details\n\nThe constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left:\n\n```ts\nconst zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address);\n\nif (zone) {\n  this.zone = zone[0];\n\n  address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, '');\n}\n\nconst longest = this.groups * 5 + 5;\n\nif (address.length > longest) {\n  throw new AddressError(`IP","public_affected_ranges":["<= 10.7.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:12.381Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010585","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","CVE-2026-111997"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-579cd0076e434cdca68134b39ef79593"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond.\n\nAn application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect.\n\n### Details\n\nThe constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left:\n\n```ts\nconst zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address);\n\nif (zone) {\n  this.zone = zone[0];\n\n  address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, '');\n}\n\nconst longest = this.groups * 5 + 5;\n\nif (address.length > longest) {\n  throw new AddressError(`IP","public_affected_ranges":["<= 10.7.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.624Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-22T16:19:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}