{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010659","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","CVE-2026-112950"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @vitest/mocker, @vitest/mocker. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.12 for @vitest/mocker. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-166e253f2ba8d7d2bcb2b9acc7e96142"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.3 for @vitest/mocker. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-166e253f2ba8d7d2bcb2b9acc7e96142"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.542%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45574. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-166e253f2ba8d7d2bcb2b9acc7e96142","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:14:15.837Z"},{"id":"sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-112950","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.11, < 4.1.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0-rc.2, < 5.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-166e253f2ba8d7d2bcb2b9acc7e96142"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 4.1.11; fixed 4.1.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-166e253f2ba8d7d2bcb2b9acc7e96142"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 5.0.0-rc.2; fixed 5.0.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T00:57:04.324Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010659","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","CVE-2026-112950"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @vitest/mocker, @vitest/mocker. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.542%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45574. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"sr-2f14cee7d34cec47c511620224bddfc3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-112950","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:27.688Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.11, < 4.1.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0-rc.2, < 5.0.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.443Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010659","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","CVE-2026-112950"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @vitest/mocker, @vitest/mocker. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.11, < 4.1.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8df59455039c40a273dd98dfaef145ae"],"technology":"@vitest/mocker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0-rc.2, < 5.0.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.627Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:39.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T19:48:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:30.906Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}