{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","CVE-2026-121424"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.1.4 for nodemailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7b25c0c1347f4daa12101c947c2de797"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:53:05.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"sr-7b25c0c1347f4daa12101c947c2de797","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:57:23.789Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Vulnerability summary\n\nRFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) ) ` names `v@victim.com` with `x(y) ` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `evil@evil.com`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.\n\n### Attacker capabilities\n\nThe attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects.\n\n### Realistic exploitation scenario\n\nAn application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits `Victim (x(y) ) `, which validates as `v@victim.com`. Nodemailer delivers to `evil@evil.com`. In the inbound direction, a DMARC ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 10.1.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7b25c0c1347f4daa12101c947c2de797"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Vulnerability summary\n\nRFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) ) ` names `v@victim.com` with `x(y) ` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `evil@evil.com`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.\n\n### Attacker capabilities\n\nThe attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects.\n\n### Realistic exploitation scenario\n\nAn application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits `Victim (x(y) ) `, which validates as `v@victim.com`. Nodemailer delivers to `evil@evil.com`. In the inbound direction, a DMARC ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 10.1.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T03:52:54.736Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:53:05.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:53:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"},{"id":"NVI-00010691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T21:53:05.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8b4fc0212e69019869c9e9c26867ffa"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Vulnerability summary\n\nRFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) ) ` names `v@victim.com` with `x(y) ` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `evil@evil.com`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.\n\n### Attacker capabilities\n\nThe attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects.\n\n### Realistic exploitation scenario\n\nAn application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits `Victim (x(y) ) `, which validates as `v@victim.com`. Nodemailer delivers to `evil@evil.com`. In the inbound direction, a DMARC ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 10.1.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:12.375Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-23T21:53:05.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-23T21:53:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:07:08.657Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}