{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010869","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in ichigo-baileys (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jmwp-25hp-85hw"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for ichigo-baileys, ichigo-baileys, ichigo-baileys. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-35ef176c28b1fd823950733b32b1b763"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-35ef176c28b1fd823950733b32b1b763","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jmwp-25hp-85hw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jmwp-25hp-85hw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:24.290Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-35ef176c28b1fd823950733b32b1b763"],"technology":"ichigo-baileys","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js` lines 45-67 define a char-code decoder (`qvnr`) and use it to build the channel JID `120363428355171197@newsletter` and the method names `newsletterFollow` and `newsletterMute` (cited line 56: `const pzha = qvnr(`), so neither the JID nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1119-1134, in the `connection.update` handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens, then call `sock[pzha` (follow) and, 3 seconds later, `sockwjcf` (mute) for the JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 86-112 add a second routine, `autoJoinChannels`, that 30 seconds after the connection opens sends FOLLOW and then MUTE for the plain-literal JID `120363402057133599@newsletter`. The code i","public_affected_ranges":["> 0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-35ef176c28b1fd823950733b32b1b763"],"technology":"ichigo-baileys","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js` lines 45-67 define a char-code decoder (`qvnr`) and use it to build the channel JID `120363428355171197@newsletter` and the method names `newsletterFollow` and `newsletterMute` (cited line 56: `const pzha = qvnr(`), so neither the JID nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1119-1134, in the `connection.update` handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens, then call `sock[pzha` (follow) and, 3 seconds later, `sockwjcf` (mute) for the JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 86-112 add a second routine, `autoJoinChannels`, that 30 seconds after the connection opens sends FOLLOW and then MUTE for the plain-literal JID `120363402057133599@newsletter`. The code i","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-35ef176c28b1fd823950733b32b1b763"],"technology":"ichigo-baileys","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js` lines 45-67 define a char-code decoder (`qvnr`) and use it to build the channel JID `120363428355171197@newsletter` and the method names `newsletterFollow` and `newsletterMute` (cited line 56: `const pzha = qvnr(`), so neither the JID nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1119-1134, in the `connection.update` handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens, then call `sock[pzha` (follow) and, 3 seconds later, `sockwjcf` (mute) for the JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 86-112 add a second routine, `autoJoinChannels`, that 30 seconds after the connection opens sends FOLLOW and then MUTE for the plain-literal JID `120363402057133599@newsletter`. The code i","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.402Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T06:31:07.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T06:31:06.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:24.290Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}