{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00010969","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in css-gvqmfn-polyfill (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f7jc-h6hm-qhx4"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-gvqmfn-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7b290d14a57488db2783fa2e70f8b715"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7b290d14a57488db2783fa2e70f8b715","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7jc-h6hm-qhx4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f7jc-h6hm-qhx4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:05.881Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7b290d14a57488db2783fa2e70f8b715"],"technology":"css-gvqmfn-polyfill","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (ffb3f332a818748252e49dcf21ffb6949c531afd401ee697cc08ba00a067ae30)\ncss-gvqmfn-polyfill mimics Wix internal @wix/thunderbolt-* CSS polyfill naming and ships a Proxy-based cover stub that re-exports registry names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) as no-op functions to appear functional. On require of thunderboltRegistry.js, an IIFE unconditionally executes `id`, `whoami`, `uname -a`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and `cat /etc/hosts` via child_process, collects os.hostname, Node version, platform, and pid, and sends the output together with an `rce-poc` beacon to the hardcoded attacker endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f over plain HTTP. The accompanying registry-manifest.min.json points sibling registries to parastorage.com URLs that do not host this file, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix build environments.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF (source)","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.415Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T06:30:39.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T06:30:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:05.881Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}