{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011157","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in pino-ulid (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5qw6-rpv6-623h"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for pino-ulid, pino-ulid, pino-ulid, pino-ulid. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5qw6-rpv6-623h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5qw6-rpv6-623h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:53.199Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4"],"technology":"pino-ulid","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779)\npino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/","public_affected_ranges":["= 2.12.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4"],"technology":"pino-ulid","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779)\npino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/","public_affected_ranges":["> 0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4"],"technology":"pino-ulid","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779)\npino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/","public_affected_ranges":["= 3.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f516ffe8189348e1e64f785e3fde1bc4"],"technology":"pino-ulid","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779)\npino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/","public_affected_ranges":["= 2.12.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.435Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-30T03:32:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-14T18:31:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:53.199Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}