{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011168","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in danz-bails (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-83xg-jvg8-96qw"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for danz-bails, danz-bails, danz-bails. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-f90b624459d7d553f6781ca2867b4bb4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-f90b624459d7d553f6781ca2867b4bb4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-83xg-jvg8-96qw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-83xg-jvg8-96qw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:24.290Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f90b624459d7d553f6781ca2867b4bb4"],"technology":"danz-bails","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-90 (cited line 68: `QueryIds.FOLLOW`) run in the body of `makeNewsletterSocket`, so they fire whenever a socket is created: 10 seconds later, and then at 3-second intervals, the code sends FOLLOW queries for three channel JIDs, each stored as a base64 literal decoded with `Buffer.from(..., \"base64\")`: `120363424403369453@newsletter`, `120363423038562425@newsletter` and `120363427530519865@newsletter`. There is no option to turn this off and the README does not mention it.\n\nSeparately, `package/lib/Socket/danz-auto-follow.js` follows the channel behind invite code `0029VbD7H6m9MF9ALdskro07` on connect. That one is documented in the 1.1.0 README with a `danzAutoFollowChannel: false` opt-out; the ","public_affected_ranges":["> 0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f90b624459d7d553f6781ca2867b4bb4"],"technology":"danz-bails","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-90 (cited line 68: `QueryIds.FOLLOW`) run in the body of `makeNewsletterSocket`, so they fire whenever a socket is created: 10 seconds later, and then at 3-second intervals, the code sends FOLLOW queries for three channel JIDs, each stored as a base64 literal decoded with `Buffer.from(..., \"base64\")`: `120363424403369453@newsletter`, `120363423038562425@newsletter` and `120363427530519865@newsletter`. There is no option to turn this off and the README does not mention it.\n\nSeparately, `package/lib/Socket/danz-auto-follow.js` follows the channel behind invite code `0029VbD7H6m9MF9ALdskro07` on connect. That one is documented in the 1.1.0 README with a `danzAutoFollowChannel: false` opt-out; the ","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-f90b624459d7d553f6781ca2867b4bb4"],"technology":"danz-bails","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.\n\n`package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-90 (cited line 68: `QueryIds.FOLLOW`) run in the body of `makeNewsletterSocket`, so they fire whenever a socket is created: 10 seconds later, and then at 3-second intervals, the code sends FOLLOW queries for three channel JIDs, each stored as a base64 literal decoded with `Buffer.from(..., \"base64\")`: `120363424403369453@newsletter`, `120363423038562425@newsletter` and `120363427530519865@newsletter`. There is no option to turn this off and the README does not mention it.\n\nSeparately, `package/lib/Socket/danz-auto-follow.js` follows the channel behind invite code `0029VbD7H6m9MF9ALdskro07` on connect. That one is documented in the 1.1.0 README with a `danzAutoFollowChannel: false` opt-out; the ","public_affected_ranges":["= 1.1.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:22.436Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T06:31:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T06:31:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:24.290Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}