{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","CVE-2026-112943"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2e15f8f0630d315b0910e64199c38432"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T19:55:49.343Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-2e15f8f0630d315b0910e64199c38432"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-2e15f8f0630d315b0910e64199c38432","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112943","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-112943","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:44.915Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.390Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T18:30:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T18:30:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","CVE-2026-112943"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0f531f83dcf5023ad51de90b40e610e6"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- The user uses Windows\n- An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%`\n- Either of\n  - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value\n  - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed\n\n### Details\n\nUnlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables.\n\nBecause `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.\n\n- If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.595Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T18:30:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T18:30:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}