{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011773","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage: Explicit negative email verification can be ignored during shared OAuth profile normalization","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","CVE-2026-106460"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-auth-node, @backstage/plugin-auth-node. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1b5f6559b8755aa660848e5da7e7af00"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.396%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3382. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1b5f6559b8755aa660848e5da7e7af00"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"sr-1b5f6559b8755aa660848e5da7e7af00","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-106460","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.774Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.0, < 0.6.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, < 0.7.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.396Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011773","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage: Explicit negative email verification can be ignored during shared OAuth profile normalization","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","CVE-2026-106460"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-auth-node, @backstage/plugin-auth-node. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0733a3f16f649b755dbcdc1122bdd71a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.314%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24322. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0733a3f16f649b755dbcdc1122bdd71a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"sr-0733a3f16f649b755dbcdc1122bdd71a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-106460","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.839Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.0, < 0.6.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, < 0.7.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.014Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011773","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Backstage: Explicit negative email verification can be ignored during shared OAuth profile normalization","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","CVE-2026-106460"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-auth-node, @backstage/plugin-auth-node. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.0, < 0.6.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-218886aee4e5efcf739772452a19262d"],"technology":"@backstage/plugin-auth-node","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nSeveral Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`.\n\nExploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.\n\nAn absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.\n\nThis advisory covers the shared Pass","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, < 0.7.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.602Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T20:23:52.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:46.232Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}