{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011884","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","CVE-2026-102695"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0588734e51afde6fbd6055d8cf9cd0b5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.306%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.23381. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0588734e51afde6fbd6055d8cf9cd0b5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-0588734e51afde6fbd6055d8cf9cd0b5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-102695","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.837Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.14.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.7.33"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.14.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.4.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.007Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T22:35:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011884","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","CVE-2026-102695"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7a4e7cef190bade474f6f01fb79bacd9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.306%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.23399. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-7a4e7cef190bade474f6f01fb79bacd9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-7a4e7cef190bade474f6f01fb79bacd9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-102695","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:43.063Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.14.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.7.33"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.14.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.4.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:21.815Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T22:35:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011884","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","CVE-2026-102695"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces, org.omnifaces:omnifaces. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.14.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.7.33"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.14.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50e8d9e9f5398ee55005a91b3e8a2538"],"technology":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n  loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n  wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n  returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n  an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n  I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.4.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.613Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-14T15:58:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T22:35:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}