{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011955","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: Authorization bypass on WorkflowRun update allows cross-project takeover of workflow runs","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","CVE-2026-113727"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-12fbcefb1e2d82005705fef1cb035253"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T03:16:31.367Z","value":"7.4 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0107b3928a8135d7dda6ea800bf073f3"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.465%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4028. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-12fbcefb1e2d82005705fef1cb035253"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-0107b3928a8135d7dda6ea800bf073f3","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113727","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-113727","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:44.915Z"},{"id":"sr-12fbcefb1e2d82005705fef1cb035253","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-113727","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.841Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0, < 1.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0, < 1.2.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.614Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011955","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: Authorization bypass on WorkflowRun update allows cross-project takeover of workflow runs","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","CVE-2026-113727"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0107b3928a8135d7dda6ea800bf073f3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T03:16:31.367Z","value":"7.4 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0107b3928a8135d7dda6ea800bf073f3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-0107b3928a8135d7dda6ea800bf073f3","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113727","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-113727","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:44.915Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0, < 1.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0, < 1.2.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.365Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011955","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: Authorization bypass on WorkflowRun update allows cross-project takeover of workflow runs","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","CVE-2026-113727"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0, < 1.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e5f3d65aad95def28d75b139ce6e4fe"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo API server authorized `PUT .../workflowruns/{runName}` against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.\n\nA `WorkflowRun`'s membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its `openchoreo.dev/project` and `openchoreo.dev/component` labels. Because the `workflowrun:update` check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding `workflowrun:update` on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.\n\nThe namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0, < 1.2.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.617Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-21T16:29:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}