{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011982","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45","CVE-2026-105697"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for langflow, langflow-base, lfx. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T19:57:02.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:23.763Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1"],"technology":"langflow","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.3**, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever `command` / `args` a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in `bash -c \"exec {command} ...\"`. Any user able to reach the MCP server settings (\"Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server\", `POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}`) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a \"server\" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (`touch`, `rm -rf`, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.\n\nWith the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, `GET /api/v1/auto_login` hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. `AUTO_LOGIN` is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.\n\nThe issue was fixed in two steps and is **fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3** (and 1.11.0+):\n\n- **1.9.0** — #","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1"],"technology":"langflow-base","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.3**, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever `command` / `args` a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in `bash -c \"exec {command} ...\"`. Any user able to reach the MCP server settings (\"Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server\", `POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}`) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a \"server\" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (`touch`, `rm -rf`, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.\n\nWith the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, `GET /api/v1/auto_login` hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. `AUTO_LOGIN` is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.\n\nThe issue was fixed in two steps and is **fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3** (and 1.11.0+):\n\n- **1.9.0** — #","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-780c0193ef9e931672590b0f6c9748a1"],"technology":"lfx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.3**, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever `command` / `args` a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in `bash -c \"exec {command} ...\"`. Any user able to reach the MCP server settings (\"Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server\", `POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}`) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a \"server\" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (`touch`, `rm -rf`, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.\n\nWith the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, `GET /api/v1/auto_login` hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. `AUTO_LOGIN` is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.\n\nThe issue was fixed in two steps and is **fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3** (and 1.11.0+):\n\n- **1.9.0** — #","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.10.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.619Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T19:57:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-07T20:36:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:58:23.763Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}