{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00011989","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","CVE-2026-112942"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-006cbfbce951f80355556362a7096b4a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T16:17:15.207Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-29221a10abfb107815d3b16d626e1b91"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-06T12:00:23.000Z","value":"1.344%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.7152. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-006cbfbce951f80355556362a7096b4a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-29221a10abfb107815d3b16d626e1b91","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112942","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-112942","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:44.915Z"},{"id":"sr-006cbfbce951f80355556362a7096b4a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-112942","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:43.514Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:26.074Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011989","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","CVE-2026-112942"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-21T16:17:15.207Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-29221a10abfb107815d3b16d626e1b91"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"1.344%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.71405. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-29221a10abfb107815d3b16d626e1b91","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112942","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-112942","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:44.915Z"},{"id":"sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-112942","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:43.067Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.386Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011989","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","CVE-2026-112942"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"1.344%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.71405. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"sr-2f6f7197e81e988b292997cffeecd6cd","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-112942","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:43.067Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:14.108Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"},{"id":"NVI-00011989","kind":"vulnerability","title":"launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","CVE-2026-112942"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"launch-editor","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.14.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7c2054317bfb412d24c9e9df0e6551e5"],"technology":"vite-plus","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.\n\nCombined with the `%` escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that runs on Windows is affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.\n\nA crafted value ending in `\\\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows:\n\n1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.\n2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\\\..`.\n3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()`","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.620Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-20T19:48:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:13:39.183Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}